Publication Timeline. The reform concept in the field of monetary and credit policy indicated major causes of inflation and disorders in financial operations evidenced in all socially-owned sectors. The attention was focussed on the analysis of financial institutions, market and instruments, as well as on financial agency operations. Efforts were made to specify the socially-owned property and capital in financial terms.
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Gre za komentarje znanih ekonomistov, ki so jih objavljali na portalu VoxEU. Zanimivo branje. Vox columnists have been analysing the situation with uncanny foresight right from the beginning. Much of the pain that has been and will be felt by Greeks and other Europeans could have been avoided. Early warnings came from economists writing for VoxEU using nothing more than basic economic principles and a firm grasp of the facts. They showed that it was possible to foresee many of the problems that tripped up Eurozone policymakers in , and again in How right she was.
Sober people are now contemplating whether a Eurozone member such as Greece might default on its debt. Politicians will lose support and governments will fall. The EU will resist providing financial assistance for its more troublesome members.
But, ultimately, everyone will swallow hard and proceed … In the end, the EU will overcome its bailout aversion. In January , few knew the Greeks had a problem serious enough to require debt restructuring. It is time for Greece to adopt two simultaneous measures:.
De Grauwe used logic and history to explain why the Eurozone would bail out Greece eventually. There are two reasons for this. These institutions are likely to pressure their governments to come to their rescue. Six months later, De Grauwe proved to be right.
After long claiming they would never bail out Greece, Eurozone leaders did exactly that in May The bailout package was a huge failure by any measure. Three months later, Greek spreads were back to pre-bailout levels. He then predicts the exact slippery-slope mechanism that has bedevilled the Eurozone ever since. In closing, he points out that the situation could have been avoided, if EU leaders had faced up to the facts earlier.
This would have been a partial default, and the haircut could have been quite small. Most banks that are exposed to the Greek debt should have been able to withstand such losses. With a grace period of, say, three years, Greece would have had the breathing space that the latest plan tries so hard to organise, but much simpler and much, much less dangerous. The IMF botched its rescue. The ECB hesitates to erect the necessary ring-fence around Greece.
Portuguese and Spanish policymakers underestimate the gravity of their position. German leaders are in denial. But although it may be too late for Greece, it is still not too late for Europe. That said, a solution will require everyone to wake up. The rushed, emergency measures taken by Eurozone leaders in May were half measures, as many Vox writers pointed out. One of the first to lay out the economic logic of further steps was, once again, Charles Wyplosz.
This foreshadowed the rather massive increases on sovereignty-sharing that the Eurozone adopted over the coming years. The eBook Completing the Eurozone rescue: What more needs to be done? Baldwin, Gros and Laeven , which has been downloaded over 60, times, argued that the Eurozone Crisis was not over. The May package was a palliative not a cure. Indeed, none of the underlying causes of the crisis was addressed.
Policymakers did nothing, but the markets did. The promise was, in part, designed to impress the financial markets and to discourage them from pressing on the embattled Greek government.
The amount was laughable indeed and the promise was an encouragement to step up the speculative attack in anticipation of even higher profits. The reason? The drumbeat of a failed rescue continued in This lead to a very temporary reduction on interest rate spreads. Over the next few months they struggled to improve the plan, but to no avail. Once again they have failed to think through the consequences of their actions from the perspective of the markets.
While the proposal is reasonable, it is not credible. By the spring of it was clear that half measures were making things worse. What had been obvious to many Vox columnists in was becoming obvious to policymakers in At present, the only alternative to debt restructuring, ruling out an inflation bout that would require leaving the euro, seems to be a strong, albeit unlikely, rebound in growth.
By the spring of , interest spreads for Greece, Spain and Portugual were up to levels that triggered the first Greek bailout. The Greek Crisis, in short, was now the Eurozone Crisis. The number of related columns on Vox blossomed. The only exception is a column, again by Charles Wyposz, in that is likely to prove prescient in the very near future and helps cast the Greek Crisis as a problem for both those who borrowed foolishly and those who lent foolishly.
The bad news that Chancellor Merkel ought to break now to her people is that official debt restructuring is inevitable. It is time for Greece to adopt two simultaneous measures: Immediate deep spending cuts; Reform of its budgetary process to credibly enforce discipline.
First, a significant part of Greek bonds are held by financial institutions in Eurozone countries. Second, and more importantly, a failure to bail out Greece would trigger contagious effects in sovereign bond markets of the Eurozone.
This, along with the social and political impact of the crisis, will undoubtedly prevent the Greek government from delivering on its commitments. If they do, they will eventually to put in more money. They have one last chance, but success will require a radical change in mindset. Debt restructuring By the spring of , interest spreads for Greece, Spain and Portugual were up to levels that triggered the first Greek bailout. Post was not sent - check your email addresses!
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Zaboravljena lozinka! Direktan link. Kompatibilnost Narodne banke Srbije sa Evropskom centralnom bankom. Univerzitet u Kragujevcu, Ekonomski fakultet.
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